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Evaluating Conflict Mineral Legislation in
the Democratic Republic of Congo
Cortney Linnecke

C

introduction

onflict minerals are everywhere. Gold, tin,
tantalum, and tungsten can be found in electronics, automobiles, and even jewelry, thus
developing an immediate but invisible presence in
the lives of consumers. They illustrate a direct relationship between Western consumers and mines in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and thus
a connection between Westerners and miners in the
DRC who may operate under conditions of abuse,
corruption, and conflict. This presence is described as
“invisible” because despite the irrefutable presence of
conflict minerals in everyday goods, many consumers
remain ignorant of their own connections to a crisis
occurring halfway around the world.
In recent years, however, the visibility of conflict in
the Congo increased, and along with it conflict minerals began garnering attention. Global leaders started
to take notice of the humanitarian abuses occurring
in the DRC: mass murder, rape, torture, and ethnic
violence. They began drawing connections between
the armed groups that committed these abuses, the
mines they were fighting to control, and, by extension, connections with multinational companies that
were supporting mines and armed groups through
the trade of conflict minerals.
Knowledge of the conflict mineral trade elicited
different responses from different nations. Some
countries, particularly Eastern and Asian countries,
decided to separate business interests from humanitarian concerns, and continued investing and trading in the DRC. Other countries, the United States
in particular, decided to pass legislation that would
prevent multinational corporations from purchasing
minerals that had been sourced under conditions of
conflict in the DRC.
Specifically, the United States passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection

Act (Dodd-Frank Act). Section 1502 of this Act, a
small section accounting for only about five pages
out of a document 848 pages long, seeks to regulate
the relationship between international companies
and conflict minerals. It necessitates due diligence,
meaning that companies by law must account for the
legitimacy and conflict-free nature of any minerals
they purchase and use to produce goods. Though the
methods to confirm mineral legitimacy may vary, the
Dodd-Frank Act is firm in the stance that companies
must take measures to source their minerals. They do
this by undergoing a series of audits and submitting
a series of reports to legitimize their sourcing measures. Similar due diligence laws have been passed by
other countries, and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development has developed an international framework for the regulation and trade of
conflict minerals.
These types of international response were born out
of a belief that stopping the purchase of conflict minerals would stop the flow of profits to armed groups
in the DRC; that eliminating their income would
disband the groups, and that disbanding the armed
groups would stop the conflict. While anti-conflict
mineral legislation did, in fact, reduce revenues to
armed groups in the DRC, it did not disband militaries or terminate the country’s conflict. Instead, international companies—turned off by the new costs
that accompanied due diligence—began halting investment and trade in the Congo. As a result, the
DRC started experiencing newfound plights: local
economies collapsed, healthcare declined, children
began dropping out of school, and unemployment
swelled.
The international response, therefore, produced a
paradox. Global leaders had passed laws in an effort
to help raise the Congo from its crisis, but in some
ways these laws had only aggravated the problem.
How could well-intentioned legislation go so horri-

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Published
by KnightScholar,
2016
Cortney
Linnecke.
Evaluating
conflict
mineral
legislation
in the democratic
republic of congo.
The Proceedings
of GREAT
DayProceedings
(2015): 50-70.
Linnecke,
C. Evaluating
conflict
mineral
legislation
in the Democratic
Republic
of Congo.
The

of GREAT Day (2015): 50-70.

1

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2015 [2016], Art. 15

bly awry in execution? Why did no one foresee the
negative fall-out of anti-conflict mineral legislation?
And perhaps most importantly, what can the global
community learn from the failure of anti-conflict
mineral legislation and specifically from the failure of
the Dodd-Frank Act?
This paper will seek to explore the weaknesses and
failings of such legislation in order to propose improvements for the ways in which the global community interacts with and intervenes in the Congo. In
order to do this, however, this paper must start at the
beginning. The story of anti-conflict mineral legislation does not start in 2010 with the Dodd-Frank Act.
Rather, this paper must take into account the history
of the Congo, the actualities of mining, production
and trade in the DRC, and the specifics of the legislation itself. All of these are necessary components in
attaining a thorough understanding of how and why
anti-conflict mineral legislation failed in the ways
that it did. This, in turn, is important because it is
only through understanding the failures of anti-conflict mineral legislation that the global community
can begin to craft realistic solutions for peace.

Background

The DRC’s relations with Europe began in 1482,
when Diogo Cao—a Portuguese explorer—first visited the country (Democratic Republic of Congo
Profile, 2015). Cao established ties with the monarchy of the Kongo empire, which had come to power
roughly two centuries earlier in the 1200s (Democratic Republic of Congo Profile, 2015).
However, it wasn’t until the 16th and 17th centuries
that European interest in the Congo really gained
momentum. During this time, slave traders from
Portugal, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands
exported roughly one million Africans from the
Loango Coast (Democratic Republic of Congo Profile, 2015). Other statistics are less modest in their
estimation of slaves sold in this timeframe, placing the numbers closer to 3 million and 13 million
(Haskin, 2005). No matter the exact number of lives
trafficked, the slave trade, which flourished until the
1830s, had lasting impacts on the Congolese way of
life. It disrupted existing social hierarchies, encouraged a view of humanity that devalued individuals
as expendable commodities, and imported foreign
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2015/iss1/15
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goods and ideas such as alcohol, guns, and the seeds
of capitalism (Gondola, 2005).
Perhaps more than anything, however, the slave trade
opened the door for European imperialism and the
subsequent colonization of the Congo. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, demand
for the natural resources of Africa—such as rubber,
ivory, palm oil, lumber, and peanuts—dramatically
increased. Since the far-reaching effects of the slave
trade had weakened Africa, the people of the Congo
were therefore rendered essentially incapable of withstanding Europe’s invasion (Gondola, 2005).
In 1885, King Leopold II of Belgium established the
Congo Free State, which would become an official
colony of Belgium in 1908 (Democratic Republic of
Congo Profile, 2015). The realities of Leopold’s rule
were harsh and barbaric. He plundered the Congo’s
natural resources and committed many serious human rights violations through his extractive efforts
(Arieff, 2014). These abuses included taking women
and children hostage to ensure men’s cooperation in
forced labor, as well as imposing brutal punishments
on any Congolese who failed to meet extraction
quotas or pay the taxes that were levied to ludicrous
rates under his rule (Haskin, 2005). Punishments
were inflicted in varying shades of brutality along a
spectrum of violence: chopping off hands and ears,
floggings with a chicotte (a sharp, spiked hide), being shot, being hanged, and being beheaded (Haskin,
2005). The exact number of casualties incurred under Leopold’s reign remains uncertain, but estimates
range anywhere from 5 million to 22 million deaths
(Haskin, 2005). With such methods, Leopold set
an example of authority that derived its power from
brute force and violence, initiating an unfortunate
pattern of turbulence to come among Congolese
leaders.
But Leopold’s damage was not limited solely to the
destruction of lives. He also reinforced ethnic divides
by mandating that the Congolese list a tribal identity
when completing governmental forms, which “tended unconsciously to breed ethnic awareness” (Young,
1965, p. 266). Such awareness would resurface as
ethnic tension and conflict years later. Along with the
Catholic Church, Leopold also laid a foundation of
instability in the Congo by repressing the education
of its citizens. Education in the Congo Free State ex2
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tended only to secondary school, although most students did not make it to even that level. This limit
on education was imposed in an effort to prevent
uprisings and organized resistance to Belgian rule;
the Catholic slogan of the time even quipped, “No
elite, no problem” (Haskin, 2005, p. 3). While this
initiative would not ultimately prevent revolution in
the Congo Free State, it would sow ignorance and
inexperience among the Congolese in terms of selfrule. Thus, even when the Congolese finally achieved
independence, they struggled to re-order the country and achieve effective self-administration (Haskin,
2005).
In 1965, a military colonel named Mobutu Sese
Seko seized power (Democratic Republic of Congo
Profile, 2015). He would rule for three decades under what has now been described as a “kleptocratic…reign of terror” (Haskin, 2005, p. 6). Mobutu
stripped citizens of their fundamental rights, committed atrocities as a means of generating fear, relied
on fraudulent elections and corrupt political tactics,
and allowed civil conflicts from neighboring countries to spill over the DRC’s borders (Haskin, 2005).
In particular, Mobutu welcomed Hutu extremists—
the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide of the early 1990s—into Zaire’s refugee camps, which upset
among Zairian Tutsis, Rwanda’s newly established
Tutsi government, and Burundi (Arieff, 2014). The
tumultuous presence of foreign refugees and military
groups is a problem that the DRC still struggles with
today.
In 1997, rebel forces assisted by Rwanda, Uganda,
and Angola overthrew Mobutu and the more liberal
Laurent Kabila came to power (Democratic Republic
of Congo Profile, 2015). Under Kabila the DRC saw
political upheaval, Africa’s first World War, and ultimately the assassination of Kabila himself (Democratic Republic of Congo Profile, 2015). Under Laurent Kabila’s rule, an additional 3 million Congolese
succumbed to disease, violence, starvation, and other
sufferings (Haskin, 2005).
Laurent Kabila was succeeded by his son, Joseph
Kabila (Arieff, 2014). Under his reign, the DRC experienced a transitional government period in 2003,
received a new constitution in 2005, and underwent
their first “relatively free and fair” (Arieff, 2014, p.
120) multiparty elections in 2006. Despite these sucPublished by KnightScholar, 2016

cesses, the DRC today remains a hotbed of conflict,
violence, and economic suffering. Additionally, the
country continues to maintain complex, strained,
and even volatile relations with its neighboring nations of Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola (Arieff, 2014).
It is within these modern and delicate circumstances,
and emerged from this history of turbulence, brutality, and strife, that the conversation surrounding
the conflict mineral trade is rooted in and built upon
today.

Mining, Production and
Trade in the DRC
The Context
Mining is the cornerstone of the DRC’s economy.
Besides mining’s social and political implications,
it also impacts the nation’s gross domestic product,
foreign exchange generation, budgetary revenues,
and employment statistics (Engineering and Mining Journal, 2000). The Natural Resource Governance Institute (n.d.) estimated that in 2010 the extractive sector accounted for twenty percent of the
DRC’s gross domestic product. Despite mining’s
crucial role in the economic life of the DRC, it has
been implicated in conflict and has not contributed
to sustainable and equitable economic development.
The mining sector has suffered from corruption, instability, and a lack of transparency. Regardless, mining has remained a major source of employment and
state revenue for the DRC (De Koning, 2011). The
DRC—one of the world’s poorest countries—ironically holds some of the world’s greatest potential for
wealth, with an estimated 24 trillion dollars’ worth
of available minerals buried in Congo’s eastern hills
(Wolfe, 2015).

The Minerals
The most significant minerals implicated in the
DRC’s conflict trade are gold, cassiterite, coltan,
and wolframite, although they are more commonly
known by the names of their extracted ores: gold,
tin, tantalum, and tungsten (De Koning, 2011).
These substances are in high demand, since they are
the fundamental metals used often in modern-day
technology like cameras, cellular phones, computers,
and iPods. As expert John Prendergast explained, if
3
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a good has a circuit board, then it probably utilizes
minerals from the DRC (Raj, 2011). Additionally,
gold is commonly sought after by traders in Middle
and Eastern Asia, where it is used to craft jewelry.
(De Koning, 2011).
Gold. In 2012, the DRC was estimated to have the
10th highest reserves of gold in the world; however, current reserve figures are not available (KPMG
Global Mining Institute [KPMG], 2014, p. 20). The
2014 Democratic Republic of Congo: Country Mining
Guide from the KPMG Global Mining Institute offers a bit more insight to gold production, and their
most recent estimated statistics show a production of
3,500 kg of gold in 2011—a significant drop from
peak production of 12,400 kg in 2002 and 10,300
kg in 2006 (p. 28).
These numbers must be taken with a grain of salt,
however, considering the growing popularity of gold
in the Congolese black market in recent years. A 2014
report from the United Nations found that as much
as 98% of all gold produced in the DRC is smuggled
out of the nation, meaning that there is significant
mining, production, and trade unaccounted for in
official reports (Arieff, 2014). While other mineral
outputs tend to be more easily accounted for, all official data regarding mineral production should still
be viewed with the understanding that reports often
do not represent complete statistics.
Tin. The DRC accounts for 3% of global tin production (KPMG, 2014, p. 20). While there are no current statistics on the nation’s tin reserves, the DRC
produced 3,000 t of tin in 2014 (U.S. Geological
Survey [USGS], 2015). This places the DRC as the
world’s seventh greatest tin producer (KPMG, 2014,
p. 2).
Tantalum. Reserve statistics on tantalum are also unavailable for the DRC; however, production statistics
are available for the capital city of Kinshasa. In 2014,
Kinshasa produced 180 t of tantalum, accounting for
28% of global tantalum production (USGS, 2015).
These numbers qualify the DRC as the third largest
producer of tantalum in the world (KPMG, 2014,
p. 2).
Tungsten. No numbers are available regarding tungsten reserves in the DRC. However, the nation produced 800 t of tungsten in 2014 (USGS, 2015).
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2015/iss1/15

53

Other minerals. Gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten
are traditionally seen as the primary minerals implicated in conflict in the DRC but their mining and
production in the DRC are actually marginal in
comparison to the nation’s most important minerals,
which may also be associated with conflict: cobalt,
copper, and diamonds (KPMG, 2014). The DRC accounts for 51% of the global cobalt production and
is home to 41% of the world’s cobalt reserves, with
an estimated 3.4 million tonnes of cobalt in reserves
at Kinshasa in 2014 (KPMG, 2014, p. 20).
Copper is another mineral that is of increasing importance in the Congolese mining sector. In 2014, it
was estimated that the Kinshasa region had reserves
of 20 million tonnes of copper (USGS, 2015). Despite enormous resources—the DRC has the world’s
largest undeveloped high-grade copper deposit—the
DRC currently only accounts for 3% of global copper
production, ranking it as the eighth highest copper
producer in the world (KPMG, 2014, p. 2). However, the copper sector is expected to develop and
largely drive growth in the next five years. Reserves
at mines such as Kipoi and Kamoto are “estimated
to contain [copper ore] grades above 3%, significantly higher than the world average of 0.6% - 0.8%”
(KPMG, 2014, p. 2). This will be an important issue as some of the world’s largest mines, including
Antamina in Peru, Escondida in Chile, and Grasberg
in Indonesia, have experienced falling ore grades and
thus higher extraction costs (Business Monitor International [BMI], 2014).
The DRC also produces 25% of the world’s diamonds (KPMG, 2014, p. 20), with industrial reserves at Kinshasa expected to hold 150 million carats (USGS, 2015). All of these minerals—gold, tin,
tantalum, tungsten, cobalt, copper, and diamonds—
have been implicated in the conflict mineral trade at
some point or another, and they are probably not the
only minerals that have been sourced under conditions of violence and illegal activity. However, literature surrounding the conflict mineral trade tends
to only formally recognize the first four of these as
“conflict minerals.” Additionally, the Dodd-Frank
Act (2010) defines conflict minerals as gold, tin, tantalum, and tungsten, which will be further discussed
later on. It is important to recognize that while gold,
tin, tantalum, and tungsten may be the most commonly implicated in conflict, they are not the only
4
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minerals subject to the conflict trade. In fact, all of
the DRC’s mineral resources have the potential to be
involved in the conflict trade and therefore should be
treated as such.

The Actors
Artisanal miners. It is difficult to determine how
many artisanal miners are active in the DRC. Artisanal miners are independent, small-scale miners
who usually spend long days under harsh conditions,
digging through the mud with their hands and rudimentary tools in search of minerals. Modest estimates
figure that artisanal mining employs approximately
450,000 people (De Koning, 2011); others suggest
that at least 1 million people are active in artisanal
mining (KPMG, 2014, p. 18). Others still point out
that small-scale mining supports a wider community than those actually involved in mining activities, with some claims stating that artisanal mining
provides direct or indirect support to more than 10
million people in the Congo (International Peace Information Service, 2013).
Unlike industrial mining, which is overseen by businessmen in air-conditioned offices and benefits from
the convenience of heavy equipment, artisanal miners work on small-scale or independent levels, laboring long days under the sun with only their bare
hands and rudimentary tools for assistance. Artisanal
miners—along with other actors in the mining sector, including workers at militarized and industrialized mines—are subject to harsh working conditions.
They are exposed to landslides, heavy metal inhalation, water contamination, monsoons, mercury, and
prevalent child labor (KPMG, 2014, p. 18). It has
been reported that up to 40% of all workers in the
mining sector are children (KPMG, 2014, p. 18).
The 1967 Labor Code, in compliance with suggestions made by the International Labor Organization,
regulates labor guidelines concerning women, children, working conditions, and anti-discrimination,
but “with the collapse of the economy and corruption in government, the enforcement of the code has
been negatively affected” (KPMG, 2014, p. 18).
Artisanal mining is largely informal despite the 2002
Democratic Republic of Congo Mining Code stipulating guidelines and conditions for small-scale mining (International Peace Information Service, 2013).
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The Directorate of Mines, a body formed to regulate
mining activities with an emphasis on health, safety, and social issues, also issued a series of requirements for legal small-scale mining. The lengthy list
of requirements includes obtaining an exploration
license, a small-scale exploitation license, and the artisanal miner’s card, among other provisions (BMI,
2014). However, most of these guidelines are not effectively enforced and thus are ignored by artisanal
miners, who usually are not properly registered and
perform mining activities on illegal property (International Peace Information Service, 2013).
Armed groups. There are numerous armed groups
vying for power in the DRC. For most of these
groups, money is power. Money provides the income needed to finance armies, purchase weapons,
and conduct business deals or bribes. And, considering the economic influence of mines in the DRC,
control of mines and minerals means money. Thus,
mines mean power.
In July 2003, a transitional Congolese government
was born out of the 2002 Global and Inclusive Peace
Agreement, which laid a formal foundation for peace
and was hoped to be the beginning of the end of conflict in the DRC (De Koning, 2011). However, the
new government failed to bring “all rebel and militia
groups under effective central command” (De Koning, 2011, p. 15), and as a result, fighting continued.
There were—and still are—several main armies involved in perpetuating the fight. First is the Forces
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or
the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (FARDC), which is the official national military. Then there is the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR formed out
of exiled Rwandan rebel groups which spilled across
Congolese borders, and includes the Interahamwe
responsible for perpetuating the Rwandan genocide
along with other ethnic Hutus generally opposed to
Tutsi rule (De Koning, 2011). The presence of the
genocidaires deeply upset Congolese Tutsis, and remains a cause of resentment and tension to this day
(Haskin, 2005).
The FDLR was also significant in that it shaped the
mission of the Congrès national pour la défense du
peuple, or the National Congress for the Defense of
5
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the People (CNDP). The CNDP was a political army
formed by Laurent Nkunda in 2006 with the mission
to protect Congolese Tutsis from the FDLR (Arieff,
2014). The CNDP has since been fractured and integrated into the FARDC, at least in the physical sense.
In reality, however, the integration was not welcomed
by all the soldiers and many retained their original
military loyalties, thus making the integration effort
a superficial one at best (De Koning, 2011). As a result, the FARDC remains today an army with deep
internal divisions and very weak centralization.
Finally, there is the military presence of the Mai-Mai,
or community-based militias. The Mai-Mai militias
rose chiefly out of the need for locals to defend their
communities against the influx of other armies, both
national and foreign. While there have also been
efforts to integrate the Mai-Mai into the FARDC,
these efforts have been met with similarly limited
success (De Koning, 2011).
All armed groups partake in the violent power struggle surrounding Congolese mines. Despite efforts to
neutralize, demobilize, and stabilize armies in the
DRC, there has been an upsurge of military violence
in mineral rich areas, with many rebel armies staging retaliatory attacks on mines they’ve lost control
over (De Koning, 2011). And the FARDC, which is
meant to provide stability and security to the Congo,
is not exempt from this behavior: it has poor governance and abusive tendencies. Its failure to consolidate security across the country has helped breed an
environment where “state actors often appear more
focused on controlling resources and augmenting
their personal power than on establishing security,
creating effective state institutions, and fostering socioeconomic development for the DRC’s 75 million
inhabitants” (Arieff, 2014).
As a whole, the military presence in the Congolese
mining sector is a dangerous one. Militaries prey on
civilian populations and are often implicated in mass
lootings, killings, rapes, and illicit business operations (Arieff, 2014). The corruption of militaries and
the ways in which they perpetuate conflict through
the mining and trade of minerals will be addressed in
further detail later on.
Industrial presence. Even though artisanal and alluvial miners account for most of the operations in
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the Congolese mining sector, there are still a number
of state-owned, domestic and foreign companies at
play. The industrial presence in mining remains relatively small, however, because of the high-risk business environment in the DRC. In 2013, the World
Bank’s Doing Business report ranked the DRC as 181
out of 185 countries, placing it as one of the worst
nations in the world with which to engage in business (Arieff, 2014). Private sector development faces
a large range of obstacles in the Congo, “including
underdeveloped infrastructure, inadequate contract
enforcement, limited access to credit, continued insecurity in the east, inadequate property rights protection, high levels of bureaucratic red tape and corruption, and a lack of reliable electricity” (Arieff, 2014,
p. 128). The DRC poses so many concerns and risks
when it comes to business operations that many multinational corporations are subsequently discouraged
from investment, and, in recent years, due diligence
laws have further decreased international incentive
to get involved in the Congolese mining sector. This
phenomenon will be further expanded upon in later
sections of this paper.
Nevertheless, there is still a large-scale industrial presence in the DRC. The mining of gold is dominated
principally by two corporations: Randgold Resources
and AngloGold Ashanti, which own and operate the
Kibali mine (BMI, 2014). While not as dominant
as Randgold and Anglogold, the Banro Corporation
also accounts for a portion of the gold sector, and
the rest of the sector is mostly composed of artisanal
miners (BMI, 2014). Copper mines in the DRC are
also highly diversified, with major international and
domestic players being Tenke Fungurume Mining,
Katanga Mining, Freeport, Glencore Xstrata, Anvil
Mining, and Chemaf (BMI, 2014). The diamond
sector is similarly diversified, with one-third of its
production overseen by the state and the other twothirds left to alluvial mining (BMI, 2014). The industrial presence is also felt in the silver and iron ore
sectors of mining. As for other sectors, however, such
as tin, it seems that large corporations are more hesitant to get their hands dirty. As a result, most mining
in the remaining sectors is either carried out in militarized mines or by artisanal miners (BMI, 2014).
While there seems to be hesitancy to engage in private sector development in the DRC—not only because of business risks, but also out of fear of being
6
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implicated in human rights abuses—there are still
areas of the world willing to establish trade relations
with the Congo. One such area is China, which has
an investment track record that has been more forgiving of human rights violations and unjust business practices than other countries. This stance,
combined with a mining landscape relatively free of
international competition, has led to the supposition
that China will become a major actor in the field of
Congolese mineral extraction in coming years (BMI,
2014). And in fact, increased Chinese investment in
the DRC is already occurring. China has been drawn
to the Congo for its large quantities of untapped resources, low mining costs, and the fact that the West’s
relative abandonment of Congo in the mineral trade
has left doors wide open for Chinese businessmen
(Lee, 2010).

The Process and Its Problems
It is important to know the actors involved in the
DRC’s mining sector. However, it is also important
to know the trade process and understand the steps
involved in getting the minerals from the actors into
the hands of global manufacturers. After extraction,
minerals and ores usually first come into contact with
petits négociants, or small-scale intermediaries.
These intermediaries have either pre-financed extraction operations—by trading equipment in exchange
for minerals—or simply buy the minerals outright, in
order to then sell them to trading chains (De Koning,
2011). The traders who purchase the minerals from
the small-scale intermediaries are known as négociants. They, in turn, sell the minerals to buying houses
called comptoirs, which arrange exports to manufacturers (De Koning, 2011). Minerals are transported
along trade routes either by road or by air (De Koning, 2011).
This process sounds very neat and orderly when laid
out so simply on paper. However, in truth the official
mineral trade is anything but organized and efficient.
It is rampant with difficulties, corruption, and conflict, and is severely undermined by demand from
black markets and home refineries. The most popular
mineral in underground trade is gold, which has a
high value by volume, meaning that valuable, exportable quantities can be concealed easily (De Koning,
2011). It is estimated that $1.24 billion worth of
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gold is smuggled out of the DRC each year (De Koning, 2011). It is hard to regulate such illegal exports
of minerals, since many traders and buying houses
own private airlines and road transport companies,
which are often used to transport minerals and allegedly facilitate smuggling (De Koning, 2011). Likewise, public efforts to improve Congolese infrastructure and develop road systems have ironically made
it more and more difficult to trace and control illegal
exports of conflict minerals.
Militaries also engage in and directly benefit from
this illicit trade. Low pay combined with a corrupt
and unfair military payroll generates incentive for
militiamen to seek other means of income—namely,
by smuggling and trading minerals illegally (De Koning, 2011). On a larger scale, mineral profits are used
to fund entire armed groups. Unlawful profits from
tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold collectively funded
armies an approximated $185 million in 2008, and
gold alone is estimated to bring in an annual $44
million to $88 million to militaries (Raj, 2011).
These profits are used to buy more weapons in order to impose a “brutal form of order” (Raj, 2011, p.
989) upon a population already ravaged by disease,
poverty, and civil war.
Aside from the black market, state and non-state
actors alike are involved in underhanded business
deals, such as underpricing assets and refusing to
pay taxes, duties, and fines (Arieff, 2014). One such
example can be found by observing the complex
deals involving offshore companies and two multinational companies, Glencote and Eurasian Natural
Resources Corporation. Investigations have shown
that the companies have ties to President Kabila, although specifics on the exact nature of these ties remain vague. Nevertheless, this relationship suggests a
conflict of interest, perhaps even that the Congolese
President is benefiting from the sale of conflict minerals and, as a result, may also have a decreased incentive to end the conflict mineral trade (Arieff, 2014).
Actors in the conflict mineral trade also frequently
partake in tax fraud. Mining authorities, such as
commanding militaries, often levy unofficial taxes
and traders in order to reap personal profit. These
taxes can vary greatly, ranging from as little as the
equivalent of $5 a week to the equivalent of $3,000 a
week (De Koning, 2011). Such levies can be applied
7
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at any point in the production and trade chain. This
exploitation is also more regularly found in mines
that experience frequent shifts in ownership (De
Koning, 2011).
Many miners, militias, small-scale intermediaries,
and traders also organize lootings of mining sites
and villages. These raids not only provide immediate
profit gain, but also breed insecurity to discourage
the return of refugees, disrupt the FARDC deployments, and eliminate commercial competitors from
the commodity chain (De Koning, 2011). Lootings
occur most frequently in the Walikale territory and
are most often perpetuated by the Mai-Mai Sheka
(De Koning, 2011). While the FARDC does not
participate in lootings as frequently—since they are
supposed to protect the Congolese people, not attack
them—they are not guilt-free. It is difficult to distinguish the number of lootings perpetuated by the
FARDC, because when national soldiers attack villages they often disguise their identity to escape punishment by the national army (De Koning, 2011).
Whoever the perpetrator, these raids leave the civilian
population scattered, terrorized, and impoverished.
Desire for mine control and mineral profits has also
been shown to fuel a culture of rape and sexual violence in the DRC. Sexual violence is “used as a systematic weapon of war in the Democratic Republic
of Congo to subjugate and humiliate civilians in
regions under militia control” (Raj, 2011, p. 990).
Human Rights Watch has estimated that since 1998,
tens of thousands of women—if not hundreds of
thousands—have fallen victim to sadistic rapes (Raj,
2011). Although no militia is truly exempt from the
violence, many of the rapes have been inflicted by
Rwandan genocidaires, the majority of whom are
never brought to justice and instead continue to
“roam with impunity and continue in positions of
power through mineral profits” (Raj, 2011, p. 990).
Thus, the Congo has been labeled “the most dangerous place on earth to be a woman” (Raj, 2011, p.
989). Relatedly, the country also came in dead last on
the 2013 U.N. Human Development Index (Arieff,
2014).
While in no way does all this conflict stem from mining, it is not a coincidence that violence is concentrated in North and South Kivu, as well as the Orientale, the Congolese provinces containing the greatest
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2015/iss1/15
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mineral wealth (Raj, 2011). In 2011, it was estimated that 45,000 Congolese die every month as a result
of ongoing conflict, which amounts to about 1,500
preventable deaths a day (Raj, 2011). Additionally,
there are over 2.6 million Congolese displaced internally, with an additional 500,000 Congolese refugees
seeking shelter in border countries (Arieff, 2014). Raj
(2011) adds:
the dimensions of conflict in eastern DR
Congo range from internal to regional
power struggles to tensions over identity,
ethnicity, and resources…it is equally
undeniable that the multimillion dollar
global minerals trade is one of the central
issues fueling the conflict and the corresponding humanitarian crisis. Though
mineral wealth did not cause the original
war in DR Congo, the mineral trade sustains armed combatants and fuels ongoing atrocities. (p. 985)

Anti-Conflict Mineral
Legislation
International Response
A growing international awareness of the conflict in
the Congo in recent years has sparked outrage and a
call for action. Many countries, such as the United
States, have decided to organize legislation, frameworks, and sanctions against the trade of conflict
minerals, with an aim for peace, transparency, and
accountability.
Perhaps one of the earliest anti-conflict mineral initiatives was birthed in 2003, with the creation of the
Kimberley Process. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was adopted by forty countries involved
in the diamond industry, as well as the World Diamond Council and two NGOs, Global Witness and
Partnership Africa Canada (Lecomte, 2014). This
public-private partnership aims to eradicate conflict
minerals via export bans. Its framework outlines the
Kimberley Process’s governing authoritative bodies,
organization and decision-making structures, responsibilities for monitoring performance, and guidelines for public disclosure (Lecomte, 2014). While
the Kimberley Process remains in place today, it has
achieved mixed results and received harsh criticism
8
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because of its voluntary nature, self-policing, inadequate monitoring, administrative structure, consensus system of decision-making, and lack of independent supervision (Nanda, 2014). And similar to other
anti-conflict mineral legislation, the Kimberley Process has had difficulty maintaining legitimacy due to
corruption and smuggling (Rhode, 2014).
Since then, there have been other international
movements to stop the conflict mineral trade. In
2013, the European Trade Commissioner, Karel De
Gucht, claimed that the European Union had developed a successful initiative on responsible mineral
sourcing, and he pledged that the European Union
would “help keep money out of the hands of rebel
groups” (Nanda, 2014, p. 287), and “help ensure
that revenues from natural resources instead go to
the government, strengthening the rule of law and
improving the provision of vital services like health
and education” (Nanda, 2014, p. 287). Canada is
also responding to the Congolese conflict. In 2013,
they issued a “private member’s bill” (Nanda, 2014,
p. 300) that addressed issues of mineral extraction,
processing, purchase, trade, and use.
There have also been efforts within the DRC itself
to remedy conflict mineral violence. For instance,
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)—an intergovernmental organization
including both the DRC and Rwanda—created a
mineral certification process titled the ICGLR Regional Initiative Against the Exploitation of Natural
Resources (Nanda, 2014). Its Regional Certification
Mechanism (RCM) has four components: mine inspection and traceability, the creation of a regional
mineral tracking database, audits, and independent
monitoring, although the implementation of the latter two requirements has not been finalized (Nanda,
2014). Despite this legislation, however, governments in the Great Lakes Region of Africa have failed
to uphold the mineral certification process (Nanda,
2014).
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has also been instrumental
in creating an international framework for the regulation and trade of conflict minerals. In 2011, the
member nations of the OECD revised existing international guidelines regarding corporate behavior
to promote more stringent principles in defense of
Published by KnightScholar, 2016

human rights. One of the new guidelines introduced
during revisions was Due Diligence Guidance, which
builds off of the general principle of due diligence
and supply chain provisions already existing in the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(Nanda, 2014). The Due Diligence Guidance implicated not only the OECD, but also the United
Nations, the governments of the Great Lakes Region
of Africa, the business community, and several civil
society groups (Nanda, 2014). The OECD (2013)
guidelines state that its mission is to:
help companies respect human rights and
avoid contributing to conflict through
sourcing decisions…[to] help companies
contribute to sustainable development
and source responsibly from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, while creating
the enabling conditions for constructive
engagement with suppliers. (p. 12)
OECD guidelines of due diligence apply to every
company that uses conflict minerals, regardless of
their placement on the supply chain. However, the
framework does specify that due diligence should be
tailored to the individual company depending on
matters such as the size of the enterprise, its location, situation, and the nature of the products produced (Nanda, 2014). While the customization of
due diligence requirements is important, it can also
be problematic: on an economic note, it is more expensive to evaluate each company and personalize a
due diligence plan for it. Customization could also
be problematic, however, because it may create the
opportunity for loopholes. Without some universal
standard requirement concerning mineral sourcing,
companies may begin slipping through the cracks.
There are four main sections of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance: a detailing of the overarching due
diligence structure, an example of a mineral supply
chain policy, suggestions for risk mitigation and indicators for measuring improvement, and two supplements on conflict minerals, specifically designed
to address the challenges associated with the supply
chain structures of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold
(OECD, 2013). In terms of the actual due diligence
process itself, the OECD outlines a five step process.
First, strong company management systems must be
established. In order to do so, the OECD suggests
9
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improved communication with suppliers as well as
the public, increased transparency, and a companyor industry-wide grievance system (OECD, 2013).
Second, risk in conflict mineral supply chains must
be identified and assessed (OECD, 2013). Third,
companies must design and implement a strategy to
respond to the formerly identified risks. Such a strategy should include reporting risk assessment findings,
devising and implementing a risk management plan,
and completing supplementary risk assessments for
those requiring mitigation (OECD, 2013). Fourth,
companies should complete third-party audits of
supply chain due diligence at specified points along
the supply chain (OECD, 2013). Finally, companies
should submit a report on their supply chain due
diligence policies (OECD, 2013).
Additionally, several international industries have
also responded to the crisis in the Congo. For instance, in 2012 the World Gold Council implemented the Conflict-Free Gold Standard to assess gold
extraction, with a focus on financial transparency,
human rights protection, and creating a justice system of reporting and revolving infringements (Nanda, 2014). Another industry group that has taken
a stand against the conflict mineral trade is the Responsible Jewelry Council (RJC). The RJC places an
emphasis on jewelers upholding “responsible standards” (Nanda, 2014, p. 301) for mining and buying
gold and diamonds.

U.S. Response
The United States is arguably one of the world’s most
influential countries in terms of advocating for peace
in the DRC, in terms of both its aid programs and
its legislation. U.S. annual bilateral aid to the Congo
totaled between $200 million and $300 million in
recent years, not including an additional $50 million
to $150 million of annual emergency aid and another $400 million to $600 million in annual contributions to the U.N. Organization Stabilization Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Arieff,
2014).
Apart from the Office of Detainee Affairs, the U.S.
wields its influence via legislation and foreign policy, most notably Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank
Act. Before delving into the Dodd-Frank Act, however, it is important to note some lesser examples of
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Congressional action regarding the Congo. The U.S.
Congress has taken several routes to deter corruption
and conflict in the DRC: restricting bilateral aid to
the Congo when militaristic state-backed forces misbehave, such as by employing child soldiers or failing
to appropriately respond to human trafficking; restricting government-to-government assistance when
the DRC fails to uphold budgetary transparency; authorizing targeted sanctions against dangerous rebel
persons; and restricting military aid to Rwanda if the
government is caught supporting rebel groups (Arieff, 2014). In past years, the U.S. has also been involved in facilitating peace accords in the Great Lakes
Region of Africa (Arieff, 2014).
These actions aside, the most important—and globally influential—piece of U.S. legislation regarding
the Congo in recent years is Section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Not only has this act impacted life
in the Congo significantly—the impacts of which
will be examined in the next section—it has also
served as legislative inspiration for other nations,
such as the European Union, who have strived to
imitate it (Nanda, 2014). The regulations set forth
in the Dodd-Frank Act were issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission and were made official when the act was signed into federal law in July
2010 (Nanda, 2014). In the most simplified sense,
the Dodd-Frank Act simply requires that companies
disclose whether or not the minerals used—or contracted to be used—to create their goods and services
have been implicated in conflict in the DRC (Nanda,
2014). The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) begins by putting Congressional concerns front and center:
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals
originating in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and
gender-based violence, and contributing
to an emergency humanitarian situation
therein. (p. 838)
These concerns are the foundation of the Act’s due
diligence framework. According to the Dodd-Frank
Act, companies must determine if minerals originated in the DRC or an adjoining country, and if so,
10
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they must then submit a report to the SEC (DoddFrank Act, 2010). In turn, this report must contain
several key pieces of information. First, there must be
a description of the due diligence measures undertaken by the company that includes a certified private
sector audit, which simply means that an impartial
third party must come in to evaluate how well the
company executed their mineral sourcing. The report must also include a description of the products
manufactured or expected to be manufactured with
minerals that are not conflict free, including the minerals’ country of origin, the processing facilities used
to mine them, and the efforts taken to source them
(Dodd-Frank Act, 2010).
The second part of Section 1502 requires the Secretary of State to devise a strategy “to address the linkages between human rights abuses, armed groups,
mining of conflict minerals, and commercial products” (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010, p. 840). The plan must
focus on supporting the Congolese government in its
pursuit of peace and security, with special emphasis
on monitoring and ceasing commercial activity that
contributes to violence and human rights abuses, as
well as a devotion to creating stronger institutions
and governance to improve trade facilitation and
transparency (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). Additionally,
the plan should guide companies seeking to exercise
due diligence and describe punitive measures that
will be inflicted upon groups failing to comply with
the Act’s mission of peace and human rights (DoddFrank Act, 2010).
Under Section 1502, the Secretary of State is also responsible for creating a map—the Conflict Minerals
Map—that details “mineral-rich zones, trade routes,
and areas under the control of armed groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and adjoining countries based on data from multiple sources”
(Dodd-Frank Act, 2010, p. 841). The map must be
regularly updated, released to the public, and used by
Congress (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010).
The next sub-section of the Dodd-Frank Act details
a multitude of reports to be made by Comptroller
General of the United States in order to determine
both the effectiveness of Section 1502 and to maintain accountability of its due diligence process. The
necessary reports include a baseline report that assesses the rate of sexual- and gender-based violence
Published by KnightScholar, 2016

in the Congo and adjoining nations, a “regular report
on effectiveness” (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010, p. 841)—
which includes information such as any problems
encountered when implementing the Act—and a report on private sector auditing, which both assesses
the current audits and makes recommendations for
improvements in future audits (Dodd-Frank Act,
2010).
The final section of the Dodd-Frank Act deals with
technicalities and definitions. Perhaps the most important definition presented in this section is that of
“conflict mineral,” which includes the expected gold,
tin, tantalum, and tungsten, but also leaves some leeway to include other potentially problematic minerals:
The term “conflict mineral” means (a)
columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite,
gold, wolframite, or their derivatives; or
(b) any other mineral or its derivatives
determined by the Secretary of State to
be financing conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo or an adjoining
country. (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010, p. 843)

Evaluation of AntiConflict Mineral
Legislation

Anti-conflict mineral legislation was passed with the
intention to terminate the trade of conflict minerals,
stem the flow of income to armed actors in the Congo, and thus help end the violence and conflict in the
DRC. While peace may have been the motivation
behind much of this legislation, the question now
stands: has peace been the outcome of such legislation? Using the Dodd-Frank Act as a case study, this
section will seek to understand the real-life implications of anti-conflict mineral legislation in the DRC.
In particular, this section will explore claims that the
Dodd-Frank Act has hurt, not helped, the Congo.
First and foremost, it is important to note that the
Dodd-Frank Act is a piece of legislation that operates
in accordance with the notion that greed serves as a
cause of civil war. This is a notion that was championed by scholars Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,
whose work will be discussed later on. In short, how-
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ever, the argument claims that rebellions and armed
conflicts occur out of a desire on the part of combatants to profit, and that combatants will seize any opportunities for self-enrichment (Collier & Hoeffler,
2004). The Dodd-Frank Act tries to counteract the
greed motivation by limiting profit opportunities for
armed groups, namely by discouraging the purchase
of conflict minerals through due diligence and mineral sourcing.
Legislators saw such due diligence reports as a step
that could simply be inserted into the trade chains of
tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold. What they did not
foresee, however, was how implanting due diligence
reports into the middle of trade chains would change
other steps and processes along the chain. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission estimated that
it could cost companies an annual $71 million to
implement due diligence measures such as database
tracking, on-site mine monitoring and multiple audits; the National Association of Manufacturers put
forth even greater expense estimates, ranging between
$9 billion and $16 billion dollars per company per
year (Drajem, Hamilton & Kavanagh, 2011). Instead
of these expenditures simply being an added measure
in the trade chain, they actually worked to alter trade
altogether. These expenses incentivized many multinational companies to completely pull out of the
DRC due to the belief that the costs of participating
in Congolese trade outweighed any benefits (Drajem
et al., 2004). For instance, even without the added
expense of due diligence reports, the DRC does not
offer a very hospitable business environment to foreign corporations: it suffers from lack of transparency, risks of violence and corruption, and the threat
of companies being implicated in human rights violations and suffering consequently tarnished reputations. One example is the case of Malaysia Smelting,
one of the largest global tin producers, which had
previously purchased 80% of the DRC’s tin (Wolfe,
2015). After the passing of anti-conflict mineral legislation, Malaysia Smelting entirely stopped purchasing Congolese ore out of the fear of “being labeled a
user of conflict minerals” (Wolfe, 2015).
Yet even for companies that maintained business relations in the Congo despite new compliance costs,
due diligence reports were still not necessarily a
booming success. Some companies simply did not
make conflict-free mineral sourcing a serious prihttps://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2015/iss1/15

61

ority—most notably, car and plane manufacturers
“stood back and refused to use their buying power
to bring change” (Propper & Knight, 2013). But
even companies that were sincerely concerned with
the crisis in the Congo had difficulty determining the
legitimacy of their minerals, oftentimes through no
fault of their own. There have been many criticisms
regarding the difficulty of proving mineral legitimacy
in the DRC: lack of regulation on federal and local
levels, a cumbersome certification process, poor infrastructure, and turbulent conditions on-site (Propper & Knight, 2013). For instance, according to
Adalbert Murhi Mubalama—the minister of mines
in the South Kivu province—companies cannot even
audit mines in Shabunda territory, where most mines
are located, because the land is controlled by a ruthless militia (Raghavan, 2014). So ruthless is this militia that, according to Mubalama, the Congolese government cannot even enter the territory (Raghavan,
2014).
Besides a chaotic environment and inefficient bureaucracy, there have also been issues on the scientific
and technical levels with regards to the fingerprinting
conflict minerals. Immediately after mining, mineral
ores are processed to become ore concentrates—that
is, small, granular bits of powder. During this process,
ores from different mines are often mixed together,
meaning that ores from conflict-free mines may very
well be mixed with ores from conflict mines (Arnaud,
2012). The mixed ores are then smelted together—a
process that extracts metal from the ores via heating
and melting—and “after the metal has been extracted from the ore, there may be no way to determine
provenance” (Arnaud, 2012, p. 37). This means that
if multinational companies trace their minerals back
to smelters—such as in the cases of Apple and Intel—they have no real way to prove that their minerals are conflict-free, because all the ores have been
melted together (An Open Letter, 2014). This means
that companies may very well have purchased a metal mixture containing both conflict and conflict-free
minerals. There are movements in the science community to develop technology to geochemically fingerprint minerals, which would mean being able to
determine mineral origins even after smelting, such
as laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (Arnaud,
2012). However, even this burgeoning technology
is viewed skeptically by many scholars, who remain
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unconvinced that such techniques will be affordable,
realistic, or even capable of providing suitable mineral fingerprints for due diligence purposes (Arnaud,
2012).
There are further issues with fingerprinting conflict
minerals. There is a serious lack of transparency in the
overall trade of minerals, which makes it exceedingly
difficult if not impossible to track minerals to their
true origin. For example, many of the Congo’s minerals are sent across national borders to Rwanda, where
they are then processed and sold to multinational
companies (De Koning, 2011). However, Rwanda
registers any minerals processed in the country under
their own country of origin (De Koning, 2011). As a
result, companies may be buying processed minerals
from Rwanda believing they were sourced there in
conflict-free conditions, when in reality the minerals were mined under conditions of violence in the
Congo and simply washed clean by some manipulative paperwork that alters their country of origin.
Because of all these difficulties surrounding mineral
legitimacy, with the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act
in 2010, many corporations pulled out of business
investments in the Congo (Drajem et al., 2011). At
the very least, most traders delayed mineral purchases
until they could vouch for their origins (Drajem et
al., 2011). What resulted was a de facto embargo on
mining in the DRC (Gallo, 2011). At the same time,
in September 2010, the Congolese government issued
“a six-month ban on all mining and trading activities
in the East” (Gettleman, 2013). Only two months
after the Dodd-Frank Act had been signed into law,
mineral production had ceased even at mining facilities not operated by armed groups (Raghavan, 2014).
The combination of the de facto embargo and the
de jure mining ban had resulted in the Congolese
mining and trade sector shuddering to a halt and the
obliteration of local economies (Drajem et al., 2011).
The official ban was lifted six months later in March
2011, but by then the damage was already done and
its aftershocks were clearly visible in the DRC economically and socially. Official mining businesses
did not recuperate well. Many artisanal mines simply
never re-opened and legal mineral exports did not
bounce back to the same levels as before the ban. For
instance, by April 2011, legal tantalum exports from
the DRC had dropped by more than 90%, bringPublished by KnightScholar, 2016

ing legitimate tantalum production to a near standstill (Drajem et al., 2011). Another example can be
seen in the region of Luntukulu, which used to be a
hotspot for international mineral trade, with scores
of businessmen flocking there each year to purchase
minerals for smelting. In 2014, however, only 12
buyers made an appearance, according to community leaders (Raghavan, 2014). Many of these buyers
were from India and China, where the Dodd-Frank
Act has no jurisdiction (Raghavan, 2014). The sudden loss of Western clients reverberated throughout
the Luntukulu community: shops closed, families
went hungry, and miners bitterly blamed what they
call “Loi Obama”—Obama’s Law (Raghavan, 2014).
The boycott of Congolese minerals did not just
have a microeconomic impact on regions such as
Luntukulu, however; it also made an impression in
a macroeconomic sense, negatively affecting Congolese exports in the global arena. When foreign
companies began to avoid buying minerals from the
DRC, the international prices of Congolese minerals
were driven down. For example, before the passing of
the Dodd-Frank Act, Congolese miners could receive
$7 per kg of tin (Raghavan, 2014). This number was
still dramatically underpriced compared to the rest
of the world market for tin, in which most countries
could receive $18 per kg (Raghavan, 2014). After the
Dodd-Frank Act came into play, this price gap only
grew. In 2014, Congolese miners could expect to receive the equivalent of $4 per kg of tin, even though
the world market price for tin was now worth $22
per kg (Raghavan, 2014).
The good news is that while the DRC’s economy suffered, the income and authority of armed groups in
the Congo suffered too. Some reports estimate that
nearly 10% of mines in Eastern Congo have been
declared “clean,” meaning that they are now demilitarized (Gettleman, 2013). However, these same reports are careful to note that even though these mines
may be officially demilitarized, it does not necessarily
mean they are free of conflict, as many of these clean
mines still reside in territories controlled by armed
groups or rebels (Gettleman, 2013).
Another study put forth by the Enough Project offers even more optimistic findings, claiming that
the Dodd-Frank Act actually achieved its goal of decreasing the presence of armed groups in the Congo’s
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mines. According to this study, which was produced
from five months of field research, armed groups
have lost control of nearly two-thirds of the mining
sites they previously presided over (Wolfe, 2015).
However, some critics have argued that “the assertion that any decrease was due to Dodd-Frank…is
impossible to prove” (Wolfe, 2015), and suggest that
the Enough Project’s study may make the error of
mistaking correlation for causation, although they
do not provide any insight into what other causes
may be. Other research similarly confirms a de-militarization of mines, although progress admittedly
seems to be slow and unstable. As of June 2014, it
was reported that twenty five mining sites in South
and North Kivu were declared “green”—meaning no
armed groups, children, or pregnant laborers were
employed—but this is still a minor fraction out of
hundreds of mines in the region (Raghavan, 2014).
And as of October 2014, 11 mines in South Kivu had
been declared completely conflict free (Raghavan,
2014). This is an honorable feat, though with an approximated 900 mines present in South Kivu, there
is clearly still a great deal of work to be done (Raghavan, 2014).
Still, it is significant to note that armed groups saw
their profits from conflict minerals drop after the
passing of the Dodd-Frank Act. One report claims
that “armed groups that were trading in tin, tantalum, and tungsten saw their profits drop by sixty five
percent” (Gettleman, 2013). However, it is equally
important to note that these profit decreases were not
massive enough to significantly deter conflict in the
Congo. This is for a variety of reasons. The first reason is that armed groups were never solely dependent
on mineral revenue for their existence; therefore, they
are able to continue existing even without monetary
aid from minerals (Wolfe, 2015). Many militias simply turned to other trades to make up the difference
in lack of income, trades of such items as charcoal,
marijuana, palm oil, soap, and various consumer
goods (An Open Letter, 2014). Many non-state militias also simply resorted to kidnapping and extortion
as major sources of income (Gallo, 2011).
Furthermore, many illegal exports were able to continue even after the mining ban, thanks to a thriving black market, as well as a stockpile of mineral
resources in the possession of armed groups (De
Koning, 2011). Although it is difficult to track the
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2015/iss1/15

63

financial specifics of the black market, there are many
ways to surmise evidence of illegal activity across African borders. Take for instance recent export statistics from Uganda and Burundi. In the last decade, as
the DRC’s exports decreased, Uganda and Burundi’s
exports have dramatically increased. In their peak
year of 2006, Burundi and Uganda exported over 4.5
t and 7 t of gold respectively, even though both countries had “negligible domestic production capacities”
(De Koning, 2011, p. 11). Based on the difference
between the countries’ domestic production capacities and their actual export quotas, it is estimated that
“over ten tonnes of gold must have arrived in Burundi
and Uganda from elsewhere in 2006. The DRC is the
most likely source” (De Koning, 2011, p. 11). Thus,
while it is commendable that the profits of armed
groups have decreased, this loss of income has not led
to a disbandment of armed groups and decrease of
conflict, as legislators hoped. Furthermore, what little strides have been made in decreasing the profits of
armed groups seem to be offset by the massive costs
of the Dodd-Frank Act, namely the economic and
humanitarian damage incurred by the Congo.
Such humanitarian damage is also an important consequence to take into account when considering the
relative failure of the Dodd-Frank Act. Negative ripple effects from the Dodd-Frank Act can clearly be
seen in the global and Congolese economies, but its
effects are not limited strictly to fiscal matters—its
damage has also extended to Congolese society to
create a humanitarian crisis. When the mining and
trade sector collapsed, so did the livelihoods of the
Congolese. It is estimated that between 5 million to
12 million Congolese were either directly or indirectly impacted by the unemployment created by the
mining ban and the aftershocks it produced (Wolfe,
2015). The sudden lack of income meant deficiency
in medical care, children dropping out of school,
and widespread starvation and malnutrition (Gallo,
2011).
But perhaps the most disconcerting social impact
of the Dodd-Frank Act was the way it almost served
to help, not hurt, armed groups in the DRC. Widespread unemployment stemmed from the complicated reality that resources that may have funded armed
conflict simultaneously “provide[d] livelihoods to
many people who work in and around artisanal
mines” (De Koning, 2011, p. 3). Thus, by cutting
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off income for armed groups, more often than not
income is also prevented from reaching legitimate,
peaceful, independent miners. Many miners are being forced to find other ways to survive and have resorted to joining armed groups or smuggling rackets
for quick income and a greater sense of protection
(An Open Letter, 2014). This is, in the most literal
sense, a complete backfire of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
intentions—a piece of legislation that was meant to
disband Congolese armed groups is, in some instances, actually reinforcing their numbers. Furthermore,
it is not only the former miners that join, but also
sometimes children, and this creates an even greater
problem: the children in question fail to receive an
education and ultimately reinforce a historic cycle
of knowledge poverty and militarized violence (Raghavan, 2014).

Relevant Literature

In light of the failure of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
work of three scholars—Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and William Reno—emerges as especially relevant and insightful in understanding the crisis in
the DRC. First is Collier’s work, which discusses
the political and economic consequences of natural
resources. Collier (2010) presents what he calls the
“resource curse” (pp. 1106-1107), a term that he uses
to describe nations possessing vast quantities of valuable natural resources, such as the Congo. According
to Collier (2010), the resource curse can undermine
both security and accountability within a nation.
Furthermore, the more valuable the resources are, the
less likely it is that a civil war occurring in that nation will be settled, as there is greater opportunity for
profit-seeking and greed (Collier, 2010).
According to Collier (2010), there are three ways
that the resource curse contributes to civil wars. First,
profits from commodity exports “provide opportunities for rebel predation during conflict and so can
finance the escalation and sustainability of rebellion”
(p. 1111). Second, not only will such profit-earning
opportunities simply be made feasible, but rebels may
actually be motivated to seize income (Collier, 2010).
Finally, governments of countries with vast resource
wealth tend to be less accountable to their citizens,
and thus less capable of preventing conflict (Collier,
2010). All three consequences of the resource curse
can clearly be seen in the current state of the Congo.
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Important work is also put forth by Reno, particularly a study which looks at the behavior of armed
groups and patronage politics. Reno (2007) describes
armed groups as “agents of disorder” (p. 324) that
are often vulnerable to collaboration with “predatory politicians, international criminals and local
gangsters who occupy positions of power in failing
states” (p. 324). He explains that armed groups can
play one of two roles in a civil war: predator or protectorate (Collier, 2010). Reno may make this binary
a bit too clearly defined, however. As is evident in
the Congo, sometimes the roles of armed groups are
not so black-and-white. The FARDC, for instance,
is supposed to protect Congolese citizens, but often
ends up exploiting them as much as any rebel army.
Nevertheless, Reno (2007) points out that predatory
armed groups make wars longer and more violent as
they vie for control of local communities and exploit
natural resources. People who join these groups often do so to “increase their status and gain a measure
of greater personal security” (Reno, 2007, p. 324),
a motive that was clearly at play when unemployed
artisanal miners in the Congo decided to begin joining armed groups after the mining ban and embargo.
Reno (2007) also makes note of the fact that “the
most predatory and socially destabilizing violence
should develop in areas where the political establishment was most closely linked to the patronage
networks of the capital” (p. 337), pointing towards
a type of corruption that has corroded modern Congolese politics.
Finally, work by Collier and Hoeffler presents the
debate over the motivation of civil wars: greed or
grievance? While it could be argued that both play
significant roles in breeding dissent, Collier and Hoeffler make a strong case for greed over grievance.
They cite three opportunities for conflict that are created by greed. First is the availability of finance: the
idea that “primary commodity exports substantially
increase conflict risk” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2010, p.
588), because the greater quantity and quality of
exports a nation has, the more potential for profit
it offers to armed groups, and thus the incentive to
defect is greater. Second is the cost of rebellion; in nations where the costs of rebellion are higher, such as
greater rates of secondary male education, per capita
income, and growth, the less likely civil war becomes
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2010). In nations like the DRC,
15
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however, where there is lower quality of life, combatants have less to lose and more to gain by rebellion.
Finally, there is military advantage: the idea that in
countries with dispersed populations, militaries will
better be able to seize control of local communities,
and thus conflict will increase (Collier & Hoeffler,
2010). This, too, is evident in the Congo—a vast territory with a weak centralized government is the perfect recipe for rebellious armed groups to seize and
conquer.
In reviewing the works of these three authors, the
complexities at play in the Congo become a bit more
clearly defined in the light of modern political theories. In fact, in many ways the Congo stands as a
perfect case study in support of these claims—their
resources have bred conflict, armed groups have increased citizen insecurity, and greed has contributed
to civil war. However, the failure of the Dodd-Frank
Act may also suggest that in some ways, the Congo
isn’t actually a perfect fit with these theories. After
all, the Dodd-Frank Act targeted two main sources of
civil war as according to these scholars: the resource
curse and greed. Despite this, the Dodd-Frank Act
failed to end conflict in the Congo. Perhaps this
failure suggests that greed is not the greatest driving
factor behind civil war. Maybe in the Congo or elsewhere, grievances—such as issues of citizenship, politics, and ethnicity—can sometimes trump greed, or
at least play equally significant roles in driving conflict, and should be similarly addressed in legislation.

Solutions for Peace

Anti-conflict mineral legislation, the Dodd-Frank
Act in particular, was passed with intentions to create stability and peace in the DRC. Yet much of this
same legislation did little to encourage either and,
in some instances, actually actively worked against a
mission of peace.
So where does this paradox leave us? Global leaders
tried to cure the problem but instead aggravated it.
So is there any real solution to the crisis in the Congo? While there may not be one miraculous panacea,
there are some improvements that could be made
in the way in which foreign policy understands and
handles the Congolese crisis, which may ultimately
lead to more successful means of achieving peace.
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First and foremost, there needs to be reform in the
way global leaders understand the crisis in the DRC.
As is, legislators seem to have a very limited, shallow—and therefore, seriously flawed—understanding of what exactly is happening in the Congo. An
Open Letter, published in 2014 and signed by seventy
scholars, politicians, and civil society authorities,
claimed that “the conflict minerals campaign fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between
minerals and conflict in the eastern DRC” (p. 1).
Legislators have been criticized for having a grievously one-dimensional understanding of the conflict
for thinking of conflict minerals as being directly and
solely responsible for humanitarian abuses. They oversimplify the conflict by believing that “iPhones cause
rape” and “shiny things fuel war” (Wolfe, 2015). This
sort of belief is problematic because it presents an understanding of the relationship between Congolese
minerals and Congolese conflict that is too narrow,
and this incomplete understanding in turn leads to
limited or ineffective conflict resolutions.
This is not to say that conflict minerals and the consumer goods that utilize them do not play a role in
the conflict. They undeniably do. However, to reduce
conflict in the Congo merely to tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold is to disregard the multitude of nuances and complexities that comprise the crisis. Passing
legislation that solely addresses conflict minerals is an
action that only treats a symptom of the problem.
Even if the trade of conflict minerals was stopped,
it is highly unlikely that all violence in the Congo
would accordingly cease (Wolfe, 2015). The bottom
line is that even if armed groups aren’t fighting over
minerals, there will always be something else to fight
over. This is because conflict minerals were never the
only source of conflict. The issues at play are political, ethnic, national, historical, and regional; they
are issues of citizenship, of identity, of access to land
(Raghavan, 2014). These are the significant drivers of
conflict. These are the sorts of issues that should be
considered and targeted in sanctions and legislation.
The global understanding of the crisis in the Congo
needs to be deepened and complicated because the
problem is much greater and encompassing than the
trade of conflict minerals, and understanding its intricacies is a vital component in being able to craft
effective peace solutions. After all, how can legisla-
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tors create a solution for a problem they do not fully
understand?
Another aspect of foreign policy relating to the DRC
that should be reconsidered is the practicality of any
measures passed—that is, whether or not the laws can
actually be carried out and enforced—particularly in
regards to the conflict mineral trade (An Open Letter,
2014). Laws need to be realistic and feasible. Due diligence laws, while good enough in theory, are neither
of these in practice. Such laws placed the brunt of
the mineral certification process on the DRC itself,
when the reality of the situation is that the DRC simply was not capable of bearing these responsibilities
(Anderson, 2014). Advocates of laws like the DoddFrank Act expected the Congolese government to
provide an environment for businesses in which they
could produce due diligence reports and legitimately
purchase minerals, but the mechanisms to do so did
not and do not exist in the Congo, where there is still
too much instability and corruption. Reports have
claimed that as of 2010, there were not any traceability or certification systems in the DRC that met the
full requirements of due diligence laws (Anderson,
2014).
The question that follows is somewhat obvious.
What is the point of passing legislation if it exists
in an environment that is unable to enforce it? Was
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act instated merely
for appearances, so companies could pat themselves
on the back for their good-doing while washing their
hands free of the conflict? Due diligence laws may
be effective if there were a means of implementation.
But implementing such certification procedures and
institutions would be a struggle for any country, let
alone one with such vast territory and such a decentralized, weak federal government as the DRC (Anderson, 2014). Therefore, when legislators are creating processes for peace, they need to work with what
they’ve got. Solutions can only be effective if they can
be carried out. Legislators need to search for helpful
actions that are possible given the current means of
the Congo and reality of its economic, political, and
social situations.
This idea goes hand-in-hand with the suggestion that
legislators need to make an effort toward improved
consultation with the Congolese government and
improved communication with Congolese commuPublished by KnightScholar, 2016

nities. Neither group was taken much into account in
the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act and due diligence
laws: “few local stakeholders have been included in
on-going international policy-making, and as a result
realities on the ground have not always been taken
into account” (An Open Letter, 2014, p. 1). Congolese insight about local context and power structures,
however, could have been an invaluable resource in
terms of crafting feasible, appropriate peace solutions
(An Open Letter, 2014).
Furthermore, communication with the Congolese
would have better helped legislators predict how well
the Dodd-Frank Act would or would not have been
received and implemented, as well as what the act’s
fall-out would be. For instance, had legislators better
understood the needs of local civilians, they might
have realized that most miners had little incentive to
help carry out mineral certification schemes, even if
the measures to do so were in place. Christoph Vogel,
co-author of the aforementioned open letter about
anti-conflict mineral legislation, explains that, “a
Congolese miner has a lot of difficulty understanding the usefulness of these kinds of systems because
for him or her the main thing is to earn a few bucks a
day just to nourish their families” (Anderson, 2014).
Had legislators grasped this mentality, they might
have been better able to craft incentives for Congolese to cooperate with due diligence laws. Vogel,
for instance, suggests incentives via improved business practices: “the more you can help them improve
labor security in the mines and create better infrastructure, the more you will motivate them to become interested in these clean mineral frameworks”
(Anderson, 2014).
This relates to other suggestions to use better business practices as incentives for legal mining activity.
One suggestion, put forth in the open letter, is the
imposition of a minimum wage to help curb corruption. Many Congolese default to black markets, tax
fraud, and other illegal activities out of the need to
provide and survive, since most are underpaid (An
Open Letter, 2014). However, even this suggestion is
not without its faults: if the Congolese government
could not help enforce due diligence laws, will they
really be able to enforce a minimum wage? The open
letter also suggests the promotion of fair competition
by giving miners increased leverage on price in the
global arena and not underselling minerals, which
17
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may help standardize, equalize, and legalize the mineral trade (An Open Letter, 2014).
Another change that should be made at the legislative level is the push toward meaningful reform. This
means that legislators need to critically and consciously be aware of who they are creating laws for
and what their motives are. Take the Dodd-Frank
Act, for example. It is, essentially, a piece of legislation that was created via Western framework and
was then slapped on a very non-Western country that
was frankly incompatible with the ideas and actions
proposed in the Act. Considering this, one may ask:
who was the Dodd-Frank Act for? Was it truly for the
Congolese, as it claimed, or was it for the American
people themselves? Consider this: the Dodd-Frank
Act helped produce ethical goods for American consumers so that they could have clear consciences and
peace of mind without having to sacrifice their iPhones, computers, televisions, and cars. At the same
time, the Dodd-Frank Act did very little to improve
the daily lives of the Congolese people, and in some
instances, further damaged life in the Congo. Ultimately, it was a piece of legislation that benefited
the consumers more than it benefited the producers
(Gallo, 2011).
So, who was the Dodd-Frank Act for? Considering
the above fall-out of the law, it seems as though it
was very much oriented toward the satisfaction of the
Americans and not the Congolese. It may even hint
towards a bit of “white man’s burden,” echoing the
Congo’s past of manipulative imperialism—such as
when Leopold plundered the DRC’s resources, intervened in Congolese affairs, and ultimately hurt the
country under the guise of helping the Africans. If
legislators want to truly help in the Congo, then they
need to set goals for meaningful reform for the dayto-day lives of the Congolese, not the appeasement of
Western consumers. They need to make sure that the
measures they are implementing are measures that
are actually going to help the people that need help.

Conclusion

The Dodd-Frank Act and other anti-conflict mineral
legislation were created with good intentions. Nevertheless, most legislation still failed to bring about
conflict resolution in the DRC, and some even encouraged greater economic failure and thus increased
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2015/iss1/15
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conflict. The problem, then, is not necessarily with
getting global legislators on board with the idea of
helping the Congo find peace. Rather, the issue at
hand is getting legislators to find the right ways to go
about conflict resolution via trade and foreign policy.
Due diligence laws failed the DRC for a variety of
reasons. They encouraged multinational businesses
to pull out of Congolese investment, they were inefficient and ineffective as a result of turbulence in the
DRC, and perhaps most importantly, they failed to
address the roots of conflict in the Congo. If legislators want to truly help solve the crisis in the DRC,
they need to achieve an understanding of why these
measures failed and learn from their mistakes. They
need to pass legislation with a full understanding of
the complex causes of conflict, they need to customize conflict resolution measures so that they are compatible with the reality of the Congo’s capabilities,
and they need to use critical foresight to ensure that
they are truly helping, not hurting, the people most
in need of aid.
That being said, it is not solely the responsibility of
international consumers and legislators to help the
Congo find peace. Foreign policy and global sanctions can only do so much. If the DRC wants to have
any true chance of attaining peace and stability, it
needs to learn to help itself. Governmental reform is
essential. The DRC needs a strong, centralized federal government that will be able to assert its authority
over the various armed groups and feuding ethnicities in order to bring peace and unity to the region.
Additionally, the government needs to crack down
on corruption and increase transparency, or else the
historical pattern of chaos and turmoil in Congolese
politics will continue.
It is easy to call for the DRC to seek change, but
whether or not the nation will actually be able to selfreform is another matter. If history does indeed repeat
itself, then it seems that the Congo has a long road
ahead of political, ethnic, and social disputes, of violence and corruption, and of international relations
that usually do more harm than good. And there are
plenty of people that do in fact think the Congo has
passed the tipping point of salvation. One National
Geographic article quoted a UN specialist who had
been working on-site in the Congo for years: “There’s
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no easy solution. I’m not even sure there is any solution” (Gettleman, 2013).
While it may be a bit too pessimistic and irrevocable
to claim that there is no solution for the Congo, this
UN specialist is right: there’s no easy fix, there’s no
panacea for problems in the DRC. This is because
there’s nothing easy about the problems themselves.
Conflict in the Congo stems from a complicated
snarl of political tensions, corrupt transactions, severe poverty, ethnic divisions, problematic historical
precedents, a culture of violence, and so much more.
With so many issues to address, the Congo is going
to need more than one solution. In fact, the DRC is
going to need a groundswell of solutions—enough to
assert a formidable presence in the Congo that sets a
precedent for peace—because a few resolutions here
and there are not going to amount to change on a national level, and “none of them has a realistic chance
of success in isolation” (De Koning, 2011, p. 1).
With the massive nature of conflict in the Congo,
it is going to take an accumulation of all of these
things—foreign policy, Congolese self-reform, customized solutions in bulk—in order to see true
change. Although the Dodd-Frank Act and anti-conflict mineral legislation did not bring about desired
change, this does not mean the global community
should give up on the Congo. After all, it was the
international demand for resources in the DRC that
created a pattern of extraction, violence, conflict, and
instability, and it was the complex interconnections
of globalization that helped create the conflict mineral trade and sustain the violence (De Koning, 2011).
Global consumers are therefore implicated in conflict
in the Congo, and as such it could be argued that
it is a matter of global responsibility—perhaps even
one of responsibility to protect—that makes the international community accountable for helping the
Congo find peace.
While anti-conflict mineral legislation may not have
resulted in its intended outcomes, the intentions behind the legislation were a good start. Conflict minerals may not be the root cause of problems in the
Congo, but they are still a problem, and the global
community was not wrong in trying to stop their
trade. Hopefully, the failure of anti-conflict mineral
legislation will not discourage foreign actors from
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pursuing peace efforts in the DRC. The shortcomings and negative fall-out of the Dodd-Frank Act and
other anti-conflict mineral legislation should not be
in vain. Instead, legislators should try to learn from
their faults in order to produce stronger, more effective conflict resolutions, and should use the lessons
learned from this failure as motivation to keep chasing peace in the DRC despite all the many obstacles
that will come their way.
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